BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT

Shelbyville

June 27, 1863

Bedford

On June 27, 1863, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg’s army was withdrawing from the vicinity of fortified Shelbyville and concentrating at Tullahoma in the face of Union Gen. William S. Rosecran’s advance. Union Gen. David S. Stanley’s cavalry clashed outside town with Confederate Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s troopers, who were screening the infantry’s retreat.  Wheeler’s men temporarily occupied part of the defensive works on the outskirts of Shelbyville. Stanley’s cavalry found a portion of the works undefended and moved along it until the struck the Confederate flank.  Part of Wheeler’s command fled through Shelbyville where the Confederates made a brief stand before retreating.  Union cavalry overwhelmed Wheeler at the Duck River bridge where some men and horses were trampled or drowned in the river. For lack of infantry support, Stanley discontinued the pursuit of Wheeler [Excerpted from Civil War Trails Marker-Shelbyville, TN]

HISTORICAL THEMES

Controlling Resources

Crucible for Leadership

Guerilla Warfare

Influence on Campaign

PRESERVATION OPPORTUNITY INDEX

HIGH

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BATTLEFIELD IMAGE

SITE DETAILS

County

Bedford

Date

June 27, 1863

Preservation Opportunity

HIGH

Confederate Units

Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s Cavalry 4th Alabama Cavalry

Union Units

Brig. Gen. David Stanley’s Cavalry, Col. George Minty’s Cavalry, Brigade 2nd TN Cavalry

Shelbyville

Account of Engagement

The Battle of Shelbyville

Posted on June 28, 2017 by Sean Michael Chick

One of the most dramatic and decisive cavalry clashes of the American Civil War occurred at Shelbyville on Sunday, June 27, 1863. John A. Wyeth of 4th Alabama Cavalry, writing in 1898, recalled the Battle of Shelbyville as the most dramatic of his long military career. It was the turning point in the contest between Union and Confederate horsemen in the west.

The battle was part of Major General William Rosecrans’ Tullahoma offensive. Rosecrans needed to force his army through the fortified highland rim of middle Tennessee, held by General Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee. Beyond this point were fertile fields of Tennessee and then Chattanooga. Rosecrans paused his army for six months after his victory at Stones River, improving training and staffs.

Mostly, he wanted a cavalry force that could compete with the Rebels. By June 1863, Rosecrans felt his force was ready.

The bulk of the Army of the Cumberland was sent through Hoover’s Gap and Gilley’s Gap in an attempt to turn Bragg’s right flank. Rosecrans sent Alexander McCook’s XX Corps to attack Liberty Gap in the center. To the west, Rosecrans sent two divisions to threaten Shelbyville, a town that Bragg had fortified over the winter. One was the cavalry division led by Brigadier General Robert Mitchell. The other was an infantry division commanded by Brigadier General Absalom Baird. Overall command of the feint was held by Major General Gordon Granger, although Major General David Stanley, the cavalry corps commander, was with Mitchell’s division. Rosecrans’ entire offensive was slowed down by a great rainstorm that began on June 24 and did not abate until July 4, Granger’s feint began on June 23, striking Brigadier General William Martin’s division of Major General Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry corps. The Confederates were out of position. Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s corps was concentrated at Columbia, guarding the rich farmlands from Union raiders. Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan was planning a thrust into Kentucky. As such, Wheeler’s two divisions were stretched thin, and he fell for Granger’s feint. He did, however, ask Forrest to move his command to Shelbyville.

Around 4:00 pm on June 26 Bragg heard that the position at Hoover’s Gap had collapsed. His right had been turned. He ordered Polk to give up Shelbyville.

Wheeler and his cavalry would hold off Granger. In the early morning, on June 27, the Confederates abandoned Shelbyville. Granger approached with his Reserve Corps, spearheaded by Mitchell’s cavalry. Stanley, reinforced by Colonel Robert Horatio George Minty’s cavalry brigade, was eager for a fight. Early on June 27 he was told to “dislodge” the enemy from Guy’s Gap, just north of Shelbyville. With Granger’s permission, Stanley bolted ahead, leaving behind the wagons and cannons. Minty led the way with Colonel Archibald Campbell’s brigade far behind him. Marshall Thatcher of the 2nd Michigan Cavalry was impressed: “The sun burst through the heavy clouds and shone full in the faces of 10,000 cavalry, in two lines, division fronts; banners flying, bands playing and the command marching in as perfect lines as if on a parade. Such a sight was rare in the history of the war.” Mitchell became ill and failed to get his division going on time. Stanley took direct command. He ordered Minty to attack even without Mitchell’s division in direct support. Martin fell back from Spring Hill with two brigades. One was led by Colonel Alfred Russell, a competent Wheeler favorite known to nervously unbutton and rebutton his coat in battle. The Other brigade was led by Colonel James Hagan.

Wheeler was not yet present. Private John W. Dubose of the 3rd Alabama Cavalry recorded that the Rebels were “soaked to the skin, nine out of ten rifles too wet to shoot.”

Guy’s Gap was held by a few regiments of cavalry. Stanley brought up his artillery and while the cannons boomed regimental bands played “Yankee Doodle” and “Dixie.” Minty’s brigade attacked, cautiously at first, but then rushed headlong in a mounted charge. Some 200 of Martin’s cavalry were captured and many hundreds more were now scattered, although his artillery escaped. Martin’s men rallied in the trenches that covered Shelbyville after a seven-mile retreat, followed closely by Stanley. Wheeler then arrived and sensing that affairs were desperate, took personal command. He had roughly 600-900 men. Shelbyville was heavily fortified, but the lines needed a large body of men to be properly used.

Wheeler later claimed a courier assured him that Forrest was on the way and he needed Wheeler to hold so he could cross the rain swollen Duck River. The messenger also indicated that Forrest hoped to strike Stanley’s rear. Forrest, for his part, denied that any such promise was made. Regardless, Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk’s wagons were not yet out of Shelbyville.

Stanley wanted to avoid a possible bloodbath, and he did not attack right away. He sent the 3rd Indiana Cavalry on the left to probe. The 4th Michigan Cavalry moved along the lines on the right, through a wooded path until they reached a spot where the lines were undefended. They entered the defenses and then struck the refused end of the hastily assembled Confederate line. As the troopers engaged the left end of the line the 7th Pennsylvania and 4th United States Cavalry assaulted the front. Wheeler’s men were overpowered by overwhelming numbers. Wheeler though led a charge by the 3rd Alabama and 8th Confederate Cavalry that threw back the 7th Pennsylvania and 4th United States Cavalry for a time. In Shelbyville itself, Wheeler rallied his command for a desperate stand. The last of the supply trains had not yet cleared the town and the “War Child” was determined to protect them.

Wheeler formed his men in the Shelbyville square, the courthouse on the left and the depot on the right. He faced one cannon from the 2nd Arkansas Artillery down the main road that Stanley would likely use to strike at the Rebels. The excited Wheeler rode about exhorting his men to hold out. Wheeler’s artillery fire had the desired effect. Minty’s troopers fell back in surprise.

Minty then moved out of range to regroup while the 18th Ohio Artillery shelled the Confederates. All winter and spring Minty had been training his men in mounted charges. He was about to show that such training had not been in vain. Minty ordered an attack. 150 men of the 7th Pennsylvania formed in a column in the streets of Shelbyville, just behind the guns of the 18th Ohio Battery and awaited the order to advance. Supporting them was the 5th Tennessee and 4th United States Cavalry. For the former unit it was a homecoming, as some in the ranks were residents of Shelbyville.

Two cannons were placed hub to hub on the street. When they fired the column emerged out of the smoke at a full gallop with sabers drawn. The Rebel artillery overshot, and only two Federals went down; the rest pressed on. Adjutant George Steahlin wrote that the men made “right cuts, left cuts, front cuts, and rear cuts making thrusts right, left and front – dealing death at every blow.” Major Charles Davis, who led the vanguard of the attack, was later awarded the Medal of Honor.

The surprise and shock value of the attack broke the Confederate defense almost immediately, with Wheeler’s right fleeing before Minty even came to grips with the Rebels. Wheeler retreated to the railroad depot where he made a brief stand before retreating. In the chaos two cannons were captured and their crews were cut down. Major Frank Mix’s 4th Michigan Cavalry forced 250 fleeing Rebels into an enclosed garden compound where they surrendered. Martin’s division was dissolving.

The 3rd Indiana Cavalry appeared out of one of the side streets after taking the Rowesville Bridge. Until now it had been unengaged. A close fought battle ensued, with sabers being freely used. The men also reverted to using their carbines as clubs. The Rebels fled across the Duck River. One cannon’s wheels broke on the Skull Camp Bridge, partially blocking the way and creating more panic. Nine men were trampled to death in the stampede for the bridge.

At some point Wheeler, wearing his full dress uniform with a plume, was shot at but survived when some of his men rushed in front him to form a human shield. Cut off from the Skull Camp Bridge, they had to brave the swollen Duck River. Wheeler with sixty men charged the Union cavalry. According to Private John A. Wyeth of 4th Alabama Cavalry, Wheeler charged with his sword out and his hat in hand. The Rebels broke through and were pursued. Martin was saved when Sergeant Phil Duncan of the 8th Confederate Cavalry drove off a Union horseman. Wheeler plunged into the river from a fifteen-foot height. Martin led his horse in less dramatically. Of the sixty men Wheeler had led in his escape, only thirteen had survived.

In many postwar accounts, it was claimed that Wheeler, after crossing the Duck River, was informed by Major Rambaut from Forrest’s staff that Forrest was approaching with his command from Columbia. Forrest wanted to know if he could cross using the Skull Camp Bridge, which had just then fallen into Union hands.

Wheeler decided to attack again with 400 volunteers. It is possible that Wheeler did try to use last minute heroics, but it seems unlikely. The bridge was clogged with dead horses and men and an abandoned cannon. Martin’s division had been routed. Since none of the Confederate cavalry commanders filed reports after the battle, it remains a point of debate. Wheeler’s losses were at least 500 men and three cannon, although it is possible he lost as many as 900 men. Stanley’s losses were likely around fifty.

The Battle of Shelbyville was a turning point. Rebel cavalry in the west would have

other fine showings in its future; they were, even as late as December 1864, a force to be reckoned with. However, Shelbyville was the resounding signal that their days of dominance would never return. The Union had achieved parity, if not superiority, in the western theater. After the victory and in honor of their charge, Minty’s outfit became known as the “Saber Brigade.” Never again would the Union cavalry be the laughingstock of either army.

June 9, 1863 – July 5, 1863 – Activities of the Second Tennessee Cavalry, prior to and

during the Tullahoma Campaign On the 9th of June our Brigade of cavalry [2nd Tennessee (U. S. )] was sent to Triune, where we remained until the 23d, when the entire Army of the Cumberland, under General Rosecranz made a general movement South. Our Brigade went out on the Shelbyville road. We encountered the enemy in a short time. On the 20th of June we drove the Confederate before us by way of Salem and Middleton, where we met considerable opposition; but a few shots from our battery caused them to scatter and retreat, and we occupied the town without further opposition. On entering, we found that a cannon ball from our battery had passed through a private dwell house, just below the upper joist, through two partitions and out a window on the other side of the hose. A lady and a group of children were in the house at the time, but fortunately escaped unhurt. For a few days were in the saddle, first one place and then another, scouting, skirmishing and guarding supply trains. On the 27th of June we took Shelbyville with but little resistance and small loss. We charged the enemy, when he stampeded and fled. We went from there to Manchester by way of Fairfield, arriving there on the 30th of June. During several days previous to this time, rain had fallen almost constantly. It was harvest time, and our progress was marked by wheat fields laid waste, especially where the Confederates resisted our progress, which was nearly all the way. Fences were thrown down, and the cavalry rode through fields in line of battle, leaving standing crops as flat as if a log had rolled over them. The rain had so moistened the earth that our horses often sunk knee deep in the mud. On the second of July we crossed Elk River and went to Decherd. Here we remained and celebrated the Fourth of July.

Salvos of artillery could be heard in every direction, as the batteries fired a National salute. On the fifth we went over to Winchester, where we remained until the eight, when news reached us of Gen. Palmerton’s surrender to Grant at Vicksburg, which was received with shouts everywhere, intermingled with artillery salutes. On the ninth the Second Cavalry was ordered across the Cumberland Mountain in Alabama. ~ ~ ~ Knoxville Daily Chronicle, February 18 1879

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1863.

COL.: I have the honor to submit to the general commanding the Department of the

Cumberland the following report of the attack made upon the rebel forces at Guy’s Gap and Shelbyville, and of the occupation of those points by the forces under my command, on the 27th ultimo: I have not yet received, from officers acting under my direction, reports of the part taken by their respective commands in the engagements of that day, and, therefore, I am unable to make this report in detail; to mention the special action of different and distinct parts of my command, and to name the officers and men most conspicuous for gallantry and a display of soldier like qualities, and those (if there are any such) who deserve censure for bad conduct or neglect of duty; nor am I able to give, in exact numbers, the loss we sustained, although I can proximate it sufficiently to state it with reasonable certainty. At 2 o’clock on the morning of June 23, I received orders from the general commanding the Army of the Cumberland to move at daylight with all of the forces under my command, then at Triune, for Salem, save the division of cavalry under the immediate command of Gen. Mitchell, which I sent on that morning to attack the rebels at Rover and Middleton, with directions to drive them out of those places. In accordance with this order, I marched my command, and arrived at the designated point on the night of the same day (June 23). Under additional instructions there received, I marched the next day to a point on the Murfreesborough and Shelbyville pike, near Christiana, where I halted my command, awaiting further orders. Gen. Mitchell arrived at Rover on the afternoon of the day on which he left Triune, and there met the enemy. After a sharp fight, lasting for over two hours, he drove them out of, and 2 miles beyond, the town. On the next day he again attacked the enemy at Middleton, and succeeded in handsomely whipping them, and in driving them before him. An Official report of the casualties in these two engagements has not yet been made to me, but Gen. Mitchell states that his loss will not amount to over 20 men, while the enemy suffered greatly in killed and wounded. On the next day (Thursday, June 25), Gen. Mitchell joined me at my camp near Christiana. At the same time Gen. Stanley, with part of his cavalry command, also reported to me at that place. It was on the morning of this day (June 25) that I sent Lieut.-Col. Patrick, with the Fifth Iowa Cavalry and the Fourth Michigan Cavalry, to observe the enemy at Fosterville. He found them there in strong force, but, by a bold dash, he gallantly drove them beyond the town, where they again made a stand and opened upon him with artillery. In obedience to my instructions, he then withdrew his forces, and returned to Christiana. At 6 o’clock on the morning of June 27, I received a dispatch from the commanding general, directing me to feel the enemy at Guy’s Gap. In accordance therewith, in one hour from that time I advanced with part of my command toward that point, moving on the Shelbyville pike. I sent Gen. Stanley, with the cavalry, in front, and ordered Gen. Baird’s division of infantry to follow in close supporting distance. Upon reaching a point about 2 miles north of the gap, we met the enemy’s skirmishers in the open fields. They exhibited such strength and resistance as to warrant us in the belief that they held the gap in force, and that they would there make a stubborn resistance to our advance. After skirmishing for about two hours, however, the enemy suddenly fell back to the gap, and there showed signs of a hasty retreat. Feeling confident that we could successfully attack them there, I then ordered Gen. Stanley to bring up his cavalry and clear the gap at once. The order was promptly obeyed, and the enemy sought safety in flight, running in the direction of Shelbyville. Part of our cavalry followed them in an exciting chase, capturing about 50 prisoners, killing and wounding a number, and pursuing them 7 miles, to their rifle-pits, which were about 3 miles north of Shelbyville. Here, at the intersection of the Shelbyville pike with the rifle-pits, in a small earthwork, the enemy had planted two guns; by a well-directed fire from these our advance was for a short time stayed. I was now positively assured by the action of the enemy, and by such meager and indefinite intelligence as I could gain from citizens in the neighborhood of the gap, that the rebel forces which had been stationed at Shelbyville were then evacuating that place; and although the orders I had received did not contemplate an advance beyond the gap, I determined to push forward and strike the rear of the retreating rebel forces, which forces, I afterward discovered, composed the corps commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Polk, numbering about 18,000 men. I rapidly pushed the cavalry force of my command forward. The advance soon charged over the rifle-pits, turning the point where the enemy had planted their guns, and again causing them to rapidly retreat, taking their guns with them, following them to within three-quarters of a mile of Shelbyville, where we were again held at bay by a large force of the enemy, formed on the north side of and in the town, and by a battery of three guns, that was planted in the town in such position as to command all of the approaches thereto from the north. It was now after 6 p. m. At this juncture I closed up our advancing column, and a cavalry charge was then made. Within thirty minutes afterward the town of Shelbyville was in our possession. Three superior brass guns, one of which was rifled, were captured, and the captain commanding the battery, with all of his officers and most of his men present, were our prisoners. Over 500 additional prisoners were captured in another part of the town. This charge was so irresistible and daring, and was made so unexpectedly to the enemy, that they were unable to check it by the fire of their guns and musketry, and were also unable to save their guns by flight One gun, however, was hurried away, and taken as far as the bridge that crosses Duck River, on the south side of the town, on the road to Tullahoma, but its wheels broke through the bridge, and the enemy was compelled to abandon it. This served to partially blockade the bridge, thereby preventing the rapid retreat of a large body of rebel cavalry which was yet on the north side of the river, closely pursued by our forces. The retreat now became a perfect rout. Those who could not cross the bridge endeavored to swim the river, which was very much swollen by the late rains. But few reached the other side, while many were drowned. In the midst of their confusion the rebel Gen. Wheeler called upon some of his troops to form and stop our advance. The First Confederate Cavalry volunteered for this duty, and, in endeavoring to perform it, saved their general (Wheeler), who escaped by swimming the river, while the whole regiment, save those of it who were killed, was captured by our forces, including the colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and all of the line officers present. It was now dark, and we had destroyed all of the rebel forces in the vicinity of Shelbyville north of Duck River. Our horses being perfectly exhausted and the men worn out, I ordered a halt until midnight for the purpose of resting them, then intending to pursue and overtake the enemy’s train; but even by that time, so exhausting had been our march and chase of the day, we were not in a condition to proceed farther. In the morning, as there was no possibility of overtaking the enemy, and as our men were out of rations, in accordance with the instructions of the commanding general, I send the cavalry, under the command of Gen. Stanley, to Manchester, via Fairfield and Wartrace, while I returned with Gen. Baird’s division-which remained behind the day before to hold Guy’s Gap-to my camp near Christiana. Our loss in killed and wounded at Guy’s Gap and Shelbyville will amount to about 50. This number can safely be set down as the maximum. We did not lose a man by capture. The enemy lost in killed, wounded, and drowned in Duck River, at the least estimate, from 200 to 225. Our list of prisoners captured accounts for 509. Many of the enemy when captured were hurried off before their names could be obtained for the list from which this account is taken; so that, including them, the total number of prisoners captured by our forces can be placed at 700, including about 40 commissioned officers. We also captured about 3,000 sacks of corn and corn meal, a few animals, and a quantity of meat, whisky, ammunition, and small-arms, that the enemy could not carry off in their precipitous flight. I cannot praise too highly the bold dash and gallant conduct of our cavalry at Shelbyville. The efficiency of this branch of the service, not only in this, but in all of our late engagements with the enemy, has been established beyond a doubt. The enemy can no longer boast of the superiority of their cavalry and of its accomplishments. We met with an enthusiastic reception from the loyal citizens of Shelbyville; our soldiers were received with tears of joy, and our flag, that had been secretly hid for months, floated from many houses. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,G. GRANGER, Maj.-Gen., Cmdg. OR, Ser. I, Vol. 23, pt. I, pp. 535-53

Report of Capt. Alfred Abeel, Fourth Michigan Cavalry. CAMP NEAR SALEM, TENN.

July 23, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit you the following report of the incidents that came

under my observation at the entrance of our forces into Shelbyville, Tenn. Note 1: After entering he fortifications, our battalion (the Third) formed on the left, facing toward the Shelbyville pike, and charged the enemy, who were in considerable force in front and to the right of us. We routed and drove them across an open field, but they formed again in the edge of the woods, our line being very much broken, in consequence of the nature of the ground which we were obliged to pass over, so much so that we were compelled to halt and reform our line, which we did in the rear of some old buildings, the enemy keeping up a brisk fire during the mean time. As soon as we could form, we charged again, and drove the enemy toward and across the Shelbyville pike, a portion of them taking the pike into Shelbyville. The balance, which I followed, crossed the pike in an easterly direction.

After pursuing them for some distance, I found myself separated from the other companies of the battalion, and with but a portion of my own command, the horses of the rest having given out. I halted my men, and from the stragglers from the various regiments of the brigade soon had a sufficient acquisition to give me about 60 men in all. With these I again started in pursuit, and followed on until we struck the Fairfield pike, about a half mile from where it terminates and is crossed by the road which leads to the Shelbyville pike. The rebels, who were at this time some distance in advance of me, which they had gained when I halted my men (but in sight), reached and took this road, but before we reached it a column of the enemy from toward Shelbyville was seen in full flight, approaching, with the evident intention of escaping by the same road, but had not as yet discovered us. The head of their column reached and crossed the pike before we could reach it, but we charged through them, cutting their column in two, and driving that portion of it that we had cut off from the main body into a high inclosure, from which it was impossible for them to escape, and capturing the entire force, together with their arms, horses, and equipments, amounting, I should say, to 160 or 170 men. I have the honor to be, &c., very respectfully, your obedient servant, ALFRED ABEEL, Capt. Company H, Fourth Regt. Michigan Cavalry. OR, Ser. I, Vol. 23, pt. I, p. 563

Note 1: As a result of the rapid and panicked fall of Shelbyville a Union spy was

spared the death sentence. Pauline Cushman was sent behind Rebel lines to spy for General Rosecrans to gain information on the location and strength of the Army of Tennessee. She was caught by Confederate authorities, court martialed and sentenced to death hanging. She was awaiting execution when the Federal cavalry smashed through the town and so literally saved her neck as the Rebel forces hastily retreated, leaving her behind. Cushman was an actress born in New Orleans and had spied for the Union in Louisville and later in Nashville. Ms. Cushman was fondly regarded by the soldiers who gave her the nickname “Major.” She was said to have worn “the accouterments of that rank.” There appears to be no information about the exploits of “Major” Pauline Cushman in the OR. See: Francis Trevelyan Miller, ed. in chief, Robert L. Sanier, managing ed., Semi-Centennial Memorial, The Photographic History of the Civil War In Ten Volumes; Thousands of scenes photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, vol. 8, (NY: The Review of Reviews Co., 1911), p. 273. (Photograph on p. 273 also.) See also: Ferdinand L. S. Armiensto, Life of Pauline Cushman, the Celebrated Union Spy and Scout, (NY: United States Book Co., 186?), pp. 151-155, and; James D. Horan, Desperate Women (NY: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1952), pp. 118-119; and, Agatha Young, The Women and the crisis: Women of the North In the Civil War, (NY: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959), pp. 234-244

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Terms Legend

Historical Themes:  Topics and subject matter that characterize the battlefield including Control of Tennessee’s Resources, Crucible for Leadership, Guerilla Warfare, Transformation in Warfare, Enslaved People, and Influence on Campaign.  Sites are identified that exhibit themes at moderate to high levels, and some sites may contain one or more Historical Themes.
 
Preservation Opportunity Index (POI):  A rating assigned for each battlefield to indicate relative opportunity and potential for successful site preservation.  The Index is generated by a model that evaluates ratings assigned for site significance, condition, risk of loss, protection potential, and opportunities for interpretation.  Based upon the POI values for each region in Tennessee (West, Middle, East), sites are indicated as having High, Medium, or Low opportunity.
 
Geo-coordinates: General/central location of the battlefield area per latitude and longitude coordinates utilized in Google Earth